Month: December 2011

 

K-REIT – Lim and Tan

• The Dec 3rd follow-up piece on S-Reits by the local columnist (Pros & Cons Of Rights Issues In Reits) could well dissuade some unitholders from subscribing for their entitlement to K-Reit’s 17-for-20 for rights at 85 cents each. (The Offer, which is being underwritten, closes at 5 / 9 pm today Dec 5th.)

• While the yield based on proforma DPU of 6.72 cents is tempting, we would go along and give the 17-for-20 rights a miss. Other reasons:

a. enough “damage” caused by one too many asset purchases with top-ups, the latest and for which the rights was called, being Ocean Financial Centre;

b. aggravated by uncertainties caused by the euro crisis so soon after the ’08 financial crisis with global banks again having to cut costs. This will likely affect demand for office space.

REITs – BT

The pros and cons of rights issues in Reits

From our research, investors who opted not to participate in the rights issues have come out ahead

I RECEIVED quite a number of e-mail and text messages in response to my article last week which talked about how it is a myth to expect real estate investment trusts (Reits) to be a steady income yielding instruments.

The fact is, Reit managers are always on the lookout to expand their portfolio under management. The bigger their portfolio, the more transactions they carry out, the higher their fees.

But there is no denying that some managers do have the contacts and expertise to bag the right acquisitions at the right price, hence benefiting unitholders who chose to pump in more money to participate in the continued expansion of the Reits.

One of the most common questions that I received in response to last week's article was: What would the return be if I don't subscribe to the rights?

Does it pay to subscribe?

I decided to tabulate all the cash flows of the Reits with at least four years' track record. For one set of cash flows, I assumed that the investor subscribed to his or her entitlement of rights shares. For the other set, the assumption was that the investor didn't subscribe and didn't sell the rights shares in the market as well. Some rights shares have market value, and some, like the recent K-Reit rights have zero market value. That's because the exercise price for the rights is almost equivalent to the market price of K-Reit, hence there is no privilege to owning the rights.

Based on the cash flow stream, I then calculated the internal rate of return (IRR) for each strategy.

This is the definition of IRR from Wikipedia: 'The IRR on an investment or project is the 'annualised effective compounded return rate' or 'rate of return' that makes the net present value of costs (negative cash flows) of the investment equal to the net present value of the benefits (positive cash flows) of the investment.

'Internal rates of return are commonly used to evaluate the desirability of investments or projects. The higher a project's internal rate of return, the more desirable it is to undertake the project. Assuming all projects require the same amount of upfront investment, the project with the highest IRR would be considered the best and undertaken first.

'A firm (or individual) should, in theory, undertake all projects or investments available with IRRs that exceed the cost of capital. Investment, however, may be limited by availability of funds to the firm and/or by the firm's capacity or ability to manage numerous projects.'

So how did the Reits do when we take into consideration additional capital injections? And would investors be severely punished for not taking up their rights entitlement?

Out of the 18 Reits, 13 chalked up positive IRRs, but some just barely.

Seven managed to reward investors with IRRs of more than 10 per cent. Ascott Residence and Ascendas Reit are among the top performers. And curiously, it is investors who opted not to participate in the rights issues who have come out ahead. And if these investors managed to sell their rights entitlement in the market, their return would have been even higher.

By not participating in the rights, an investor in Ascott since its IPO days would have registered a 17.2 per cent IRR. For those who forked out additional cash to take up their rights issues, their IRR worked out to 13.4 per cent.

I reckoned that this happened because the appreciation of Ascott's share price has not been as steep since its latest round of cash call last year. And also, very importantly, Ascott's rights issues weren't that dilutive in that the exercise price of its rights was only a slight discount to the then market price of its units.

This was similar for Ascendas Reit, although the difference wasn't that great. The cash calls of Ascendas Reit have been relatively small.

But for most of the other Reits, it was a clear disadvantage if existing unitholders gave up on their entitlement to rights issues which were offered at a heavily discounted price to their then market price.

If unitholders don't have the money to meet the cash calls, they can try to sell their rights shares in the market. This is of course conditional upon the fact that the market is relatively happy with the proposed acquisition of the Reit, and that the market price of the Reit remained higher than the rights exercise price.

If the acquisition is seen as bad for the Reit, perhaps because the price agreed upon for the particular acquisition is too high for the benefits that it would accrue, then the market would sell the Reit causing its price to fall. Sometimes the decline is so big that the market price of the Reit approaches the rights exercise price, or even lower. In that case, the rights issue would most likely not be able to raise its intended amount of money.

So the thing is, as long as the interest of unitholders and the managers are not aligned, there will always be the very real risk that a Reit will enter into transactions which are less than favourable to the minority unitholders. For example, the sponsor may try to offload not so attractive assets to the Reit.

Other cash generating stocks

How about some of the cash generating businesses out there? How do they stack up against the Reits? Well, not too badly it seems.

I tallied up the cash flows of StarHub, SingTel and SPH since 2002. StarHub has just been a mean cash-generating machine since its IPO in 2005. An investor who invested at its IPO would have chalked up an IRR of 30 per cent, beating all the Reits out there, and with no risk of any cash calls to beat.

SingTel has not fared too badly with an IRR of 13 per cent since 2002. Despite its constant cash distribution, SPH – which is perceived to lack growth and hence chalked up little capital appreciation – has managed an IRR of only 5 per cent since 2002.

Advice from fund manager

For investors who are keen on Reits and other business trusts, here is some advice from a fund manager friend on how to go about picking the right ones.

'Industrial properties usually have 30-year leases, or 30+30. Assuming a 30-year lease, it means it depreciates at a rate of 3.3 per cent pa, versus one per cent pa for a 99-year lease for a retail or commercial building. So the yields for industrial Reits have to be up to 2.3 per cent pa higher than retail or commercial Reits. Usually however, it is less due to the time discount factor.

'Ships are usually scrapped after about 25-30 years. I think typically they are depreciated over 15 years or so. Even if ships are scrapped after 30 years, shipping trusts should command a higher yield than industrial Reits because the ship lessee can 'disappear' with the ship, but not the industrial building tenant.

'Hospital Reits like Parkway Reit is a rare breed as its revenue is based on a consumer price index formula. You can think of it as having zero vacancy rate (but the main issue is counterparty risk). So given the same counterparty risk, it should trade at a lower yield than retail Reits, which should trade at lower yields than commercial Reits, given the same tenure (because it's easier to lease out retail units).

'In turn, commercial Reits should trade at lower yields to industrial, which should trade at lower yields to hospitality (as vacancy rates of hotels/service apartments can be quite high during recessions).

'Hospitality Reits should trade at lower yields to shipping.

'But note that industrial can trade at higher yields to hospitality as the former has shorter tenures.

'As for Hutchison Port Holding Trust and SP Ausnet, I would value them as companies rather than Reits, as usually the rates they charge are prone to fluctuations – unlike Reits and shipping trusts which usually lock customers up for years.

'SP Ausnet is not structured even as a business trust and pays its dividends out of net profit rather than cash profit. I think every year, it pays out the same dividend per share even though its earnings fluctuate. I would value it the same way I value SingPost.'

So here you have it. I hope that we all are now a little clearer about the nuances of the various instruments out there.

CDL H-Trust – CIMB

Favourable risk-reward

The local tourism scene differs fromwhat it was during the last crisis. Backed by fairly resilient Asian consumption, we expectarrivalsand REVPAR to hold up. Investors,however,appear to have priced in the worst with the REIT down 30% from its peak.

 

We judiciously shave REVPAR, factoring in flat rates, lower visitor growth and hotel occupancy for FY12. This lowers our DPU estimates and DDM-based target price (disc. rate: 8.6%). Maintain Outperform, nevertheless, on a favourable risk-reward trade-off.

Not expecting 2008/9

We deem the local tourism scene different from what it was during the last crisis, with more positives than before. The two integrated resorts are running in full steam and continue to offer different experiences for both leisure and business travellers. There are more attractions to come on top of the government‟s continual investments to woo the tourism dollar. 2009 was hit by a double whammy of an economic slowdown and H1N1. Further, with a higher dependence on growing regional economies, we believe visitor arrivals and REVPAR can hold up even as growth in Western economies slows.

Dynamics still positive

We are expecting 3-5% growth in arrivals which should keep occupancy at 84-86%, given a moderate 6% increase expected in rooms next year. Even if arrivals are flat next year, occupancy should remain above 80%, allowing hoteliers to raise rates.

6% yields even if pegged at the worst

We project a moderate 5% decrease in REVPAR, assuming flat room rates and industry occupancy rates, though upside could come from stronger rates after the refurbishment of Orchard Hotel, CDLHT‟s largest asset. Recent guidance suggests that corporate rates could be pushed up given tight occupancy. The share price, however, appears to have priced in the worst with the REIT down 30% from its peak. Offering a decent 6% yield even if we were to peg its local assets at the levels of the last crisis, we see a

fairly attractive entry point.

A-REIT – OCBC

In an enviable position

Good performance expected to continue. Ascendas REIT (A-REIT) had exceeded our expectations for its 2QFY12 results, despite our previous forecasts of a healthy growth in operating performance. Going into 2012, we maintain our prognosis that A-REIT will continue to deliver, thanks to its well-diversified portfolio, and contributions from completed development projects and acquisitions. The group currently holds 94 properties, with a good mix of long and short term leases (48:52) and strong weighted average lease to expiry of ~4.3 years. It also has a pipeline of developments and asset enhancements which are expected to complete in the first quarter of 2012 (e.g. FedEx Singapore Regional Hub, FoodAxis@Senoko). This provides A-REIT with the stability and driver for continued growth in its distributable income.

Occupancy likely to remain resilient. Occupancy rates for 2QFY12 had also held up well, with multi-tenanted building occupancy at 93.0% and overall portfolio occupancy at 96.4%. This represents an improvement in occupancy rates from 92.5% and 96.2% seen in 1QFY12 respectively. While a multitude of factors, including (1) the PMI indicating a contraction in manufacturing for four consecutive months in Oct, (2) softer pace of increase in URA rental indices in 3Q11 and (3) modest GDP growth projection of 1-3% in 2012 by MTI, point to slower growth in economic activity going forward, we believe the impact on A-REIT is likely to be limited. In fact, our check on its historical performance showed that A-REIT had never registered rates below 90.5% and 95.3% for quarterly multitenanted and portfolio occupancy, respectively, over the past five fiscal years (which encompasses the global financial crisis). Thus, we do not expect A-REIT to experience a sharp decline in occupancy in the coming quarters, barring unforeseen circumstances.

Limited credit and cash call risk. As at 30 Sep, A-REIT’s aggregate leverage was at 31.5%, a healthy level in our view. Even after funding for all committed investments of ~S$255m (which will see leverage rise to 34.5%), the group still has debt headroom of ~S$555m before reaching the 40% mark. This relatively low leverage places A-REIT in a comfortable position to fund potential investment opportunities and to withstand any negative capital revaluation. According to Moody’s recent report on S-REITs, A-REIT’s leverage would still come within allowable parameters, and its rating would be safe from downgrade even with a 20% downward revaluation of assets (extreme scenario, in our view). Hence, we also see limited credit and cash call risk at this juncture. Maintain BUY and S$2.23 fair value.

K-REIT – BT

Sale of KepLand’s Ocean Financial Centre stake to K-Reit surprises analysts

They say it may have been disadvantageous to the Reit’s unitholders

The sale of Keppel Land’s entire 87.5 per cent stake in Ocean Financial Centre to K-Reit Asia for $1.57 billion has raised eyebrows.

Several analysts who spoke to BT on condition of anonymity argued that the deal may have been disadvantageous to K-Reit unitholders.

For one thing, while the prime Grade A office building in Raffles Place has a tenure of 999 years, K-Reit will get the stake with only a 99-year lease for now, though it can exercise a call option to re-gain the property after 99 years.

Without the income support from Keppel Land of up to $170 million, the sale price of the office building translates to about $2,400 per square foot (psf), which K-Reit unitholders deem high at a time when the economic prognosis is grim.

In a third-quarter report, Colliers International noted that the office market has cooled further, with many companies taking a longer time to commit to new space amid caution over expansion plans.

The office market remains highly correlated to the country’s economic performance and employment in business and financial services, CBRE said in a recent report.

‘They should have left some meat on the table for both parties. Otherwise, what is the point of a Reit if the trusts are stuffed with assets at high prices,’ said one analyst.

A second analyst said: ‘Given the economic uncertainty, the deal is overpriced. The crux of the matter is that the deal was done when the office market is at an inflexion point.’

Another analyst noted that after stripping out the income support, the yield of about 3 per cent is not attractive. ‘The price is at the top of the market. Granted that it’s a Grade A office building but why now? Why acquire at a time when the macro-economic situation is deteriorating?’ he said. ‘The deal is skewed towards the parent.’

He also criticised the 17-for-20 rights issue that would raise about $976 million used to foot the bill, arguing that it is dilutive to existing shareholders. ‘It’s a good idea if it is being used to purchase depressed assets,’ he said.

Still other analysts, while cautious, were more optimistic over the deal.

‘It is too premature to pan the deal, especially when unit prices of office S-Reits have probably over-discounted the severity of the forthcoming downturn,’ said a Daiwa report. The big concern is whether the income support is sustainable, it added.

Ocean Financial Centre has a committed occupancy rate of 80 per cent, with existing leases at about $9 psf. The income support, by Daiwa’s estimates, should raise the overall current rent to $14 psf and be ‘just enough’ to last until 2016.

If in 2015 and 2016 – when nearly 30 per cent of the leases are up for renewal – spot rents hit $10.60 and $11.70 respectively, there would be ‘significant decline’ in Ocean Financial Centre’s contribution in 2017, it said. ‘However, if spot rents reach the mid-teens when the renewals take place, there might not be much drop-off, if any.’

In a client note, Credit Suisse said ‘admittedly, market conditions are a little uncertain, and perhaps timing may not be perfect’.

But comparing with the Marina Bay Financial Centre transaction that involved K-Reit and Suntec last year, the acquisition price is fair from a long-term view, it added.

The approval from unitholders also came via a show of hands at the extraordinary general meeting – a practice that the Code of Corporate Governance no longer accepts as sound governance – and amid criticisms from minority unitholders over the price and timing.

‘Given the size of the deal and the fact it was a related-party transaction, the vote should have been carried out by poll, with the results tabulated to include the percentages of voting for and against the acquisition,’ said Lee Kha Loon, head of the Standards and Financial Market Integrity division of CFA Institute for the Asia-Pacific region, in a blog post for the institute.

A K-Reit spokeswoman said minority unitholders can call for a voting by poll so long as this request is supported by unitholders representing at least 10 per cent of the units held by those present. But the poll request, led by one institutional unitholder and supported by a few retail unitholders, fell short of this number.

All interested parties that included Keppel Land were not allowed to vote.

BT also understands that a proxy voter holding a significant block of 46 million units had already been instructed to vote in favour of the deal.

Keppel Land said the sale would ‘unlock part of its investment holding especially given the strategic commercial reasons and the volatile economic climate’.

As for K-Reit, the acquired Ocean Financial Centre will also provide strong branding, making it a key office landlord in the Marina Bay and Raffles Place areas, with the transaction boosting the size of its assets under management from some $3.9 billion to about $5.9 billion.

The deal is also expected to be accretive to the Reit’s distribution per unit from the cash flows generated, and should improve K-Reit’s lease expiry profile such that no more than 11 per cent of its portfolio by net lettable area will expire in any one year over the next five years.